Let reason drive COVID policy debates, not
discrimination
Recently,
a restaurant reportedly posted a notice saying that it would not serve
customers who have participated in the Universal Community Testing Programme
(UCTP).
Whether
you are a UCTP skeptic or supporter, consider, for the moment, resisting the
urge to toe your party’s line or base your position about the incident on an
“us versus them” mindset.
Instead,
why don’t we break down the issues, see what the law says, and apply it as it
is?
The facts:
the notice claimed that UCTP participants were likely to have been infected
with COVID-19, and that they have an “intelligence quotient lower than 65” and
therefore would not be able to appreciate the “high quality” of the food served
by the restaurant. Hence the policy to turn them away.
Can this
lead to unlawful disability discrimination?
The
underlying issues are: (i) whether infection with COVID-19 is a disability;
(ii) whether having an “intelligence quotient lower than 65” is a disability;
(iii) whether being perceived as
COVID-19 carriers or people with the said intelligence level (even when this is
not true) amounts to having a “disability” from the perspective of relevant laws;
(iv) whether rejecting customers based on these perceptions constitutes
unlawful disability discrimination; and (v) whether there is any exemption in
relation to infectious diseases.
The
answers to all these questions lie in the Disability
Discrimination Ordinance (DDO).
The
definition of “disability” under the DDO is perhaps wider than many would
imagine. It includes the “presence in the body of organisms capable of causing
disease or illness” (e.g. viruses like COVID-19), and the total or partial loss
of a person’s “mental functions” (e.g. a limited intellectual capacity, phrased
in the notice as an “intelligence quotient lower than 65”).
Notably,
the definition not only covers disability that currently or actually exists,
but also disability that is “imputed” to a person, i.e. thought or assumed to
exist in that person, as in the case of the said notice.
Under the
DDO, it is unlawful for a restaurant, or any service provider for that matter, to
treat its customers less favourably on the ground of disability, whether real
or imputed. Although the law provides an exception for discrimination based on
an infectious disease listed under the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance
(e.g. COVID-19), it applies only where the discriminatory act is “reasonably
necessary” to protect public health.
A
decisive issue, then, is whether refusing to serve UCTP participants based on
the assumption that they are likely to have been infected with COVID-19
constitutes a “reasonably necessary” measure for the purpose of protecting
public health.
Notwithstanding
the accusations among untrusting citizens about the UCTP’s cost-effectiveness
and data-handling procedures, there is no evidential proof supporting the
assumption that UCTP participants are susceptible to contracting COVID-19
during the testing process. It follows that the exemption is unlikely to be
applicable here.
As for
assuming that certain customers have an “intelligence quotient below 65” and consequently
turning them away, the exemption again does not apply for an all-too-obvious
reason: a loss of mental functions is not an infectious disease. Plainly put, it
is unlawful for a restaurant to reject customers because they are believed to
be of a lesser intellectual level.
While no
one has come forward to the EOC yet with a complaint about the notice, we
earnestly hope that the public would not condone such a blatant encouragement
of discriminatory attitudes and practices.
From calling
COVID-19 the “Wuhan virus” and “Kung Flu” to ridiculing political opponents who
have come down with the coronavirus (in one instance a patient was openly mocked
by a news report as a “virus queen” after having contracted the virus and
possibly transmitting it to family members), it is now apparent that many of
the debates surrounding governments’ responses to the pandemic, both in Hong
Kong and globally, are conducted at times with needlessly divisive,
discriminatory and stigmatising language.
While the
threshold for the offence of “vilification” under the DDO and Race
Discrimination Ordinance is high – it involves engaging in a public activity
that incites “hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule” against a person on
the grounds of disability or race, the spirit of the law is clear: the freedom
of speech or opinion, though seen by many (misguidedly) as an absolute right,
should not override the right to equality and non-discrimination.
Of
course, there will always be debates about public policies, COVID-related or
otherwise. They are invaluable insofar as they are accurately informed and help
refine policymaking. But when we allow conversations to be coloured by
discriminatory language, and reason to give way to recriminations, we inevitably
lose focus, and along with it, potential allies.
We must
do better than this.
Ricky CHU Man-kin
Chairperson, Equal Opportunities
Commission
(A
Chinese version of this article was published by Stand News and Inmedia.net
on 9 September 2020.)